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In this paper, we argue that in designing government debt and tax-transfer policies, it
is important to consider their implications for the allocation of risk between generations.
There is no reason to presume that the market or the family can allocate risk efficiently
to future generations, implying that stochastic government policies have the potential to
create first-order welfare improvements. The model provides a non-Keynsian justification
for debt-finance of wars and recessions, as well as an added rationale for Social Security
type tax-transfer schemes which aid unlucky generations, e.g., the Depression generation,














Many years ago, Arrow and Debreu argued that economic efficiency requires that any
risk in the economy be shared among individuals in such a way that each individual charges
the same risk premium for an additional share in each lottery. If such risk sharing does not
occur, then in principle contingent consumption can be reallocated so as to make everyone
better off. For example, a number of authors have explored the implications of the fact
that individuals cannot easily avoid bearing the risk in their own labor income. Given this
observation, Varian[1980] and Eaton and Rosen[19801 have argued that a personal income
tax may result in a more efficient allocation of risk in the economy.1 Even when fluctuations
in labor income are shared by all workers, Merton[1984}, Fischer[1982}, and Enders and
Lapan[1982], have argued that when there is no market in a security corresponding to
aggregate labor income then the government can still reallocate risk to nonworkers through
a labor income tax in a Pareto-improving way.2 Similarly, Aizenman[1981] argued that the
government can beneficially offset domestic economic shocks through modification of the
exchange rate when the international securities market fails to pool risks internationally.
In each of these cases, there exists the question of why there is no market in apar-
ticular lottery, and whether the reasons that prevented the market from pooling this risk
appropriately may also prevent the government from raising utility by doing so. For exam-
ple, if there is no private market allowing diversification in the risk in an individual's labor
income because the moral hazard costs of doing so outweigh the benefits, then thegovern-
ment, also facing these moral hazard costs, can do no better than the market. In contrast,
if no private market exists because of adverse selection reasons, then the government can
avoid these problems by making participation in the risk pooling scheme compulsory. Since
it is normally unclear why private market fails to exist in a particular lottery, it is also
unclear whether there is any potential for fruitful government intervention.
Markets also do not appear able to pooi lotteries faced by different non-overlapping
generations. However, here the reason why risk-sharing markets fail to exist seems clear.
Later generations cannot participate through the market in lotteries which occur before
they are born because they are not alive ex ante to buy shares in these lotteries. An agent
cannot profitably buy shares on behalf of later generations since there would be no legal
'Similarly,Buchanan[1975J argued that this risk sharing aspect of the personal tax
may explain the strong political support for it.
2Whilethere may be no explicit mechanism available to trade risk in labor income,
firms may be able to reallocate risk between workers and capital owners through implicit
labor contracts, an idea explored by Azariades[19751 and Bailey[1974].
1mechanism to force these later generations to accept any losses, implying that the agent
would have no incentive to pass on any gains. The problem is that later generations cannot
precommit themselves to participate in a lottery even when they would gain in expected
utility by doing so. By the time they can commit themselves, they know the outcome.
These problems arise whenever two generations are not both active in the securities market
before the outcome of a particular lottery is revealed, even if their lives do overlap at some
point.
The government, however, could well have the power to precommit later generations
to share in the outcome of earlier lotteries. If so, there is the potential for Pareto-improving
government policies which share risk between different generations. In fact, some govern-
ment policies do seem to have been used, whether consciously or otherwise, for just this
purpose. For example, historically, debt has been issued to help finance unfavorable events,
e.g., wars and recessions, and paid off only gradually over later generations. Diamond[19651
worked out in a very general setting just how debt issues result in a reallocation of wealth
between generations. By the same argument, stochastic issues of debt result in a reallo-
cation of risk between generations. Similarly, a plausible argument might be made that
the initial role of the Social Security program was to aid the generations who lost both
financial wealth and labor income during the Great Depression, at the expense of much
later generations.
The objective of this paper is to explore the characteristics of an optimal government
risk-sharing scheme, assuming that the government does have the power to precommit
future generations. Since there are an arbitrarily large number of future generations to
share in any particular lottery (e.g., today's recession), one might expect, by analogy with
the diversification theorems in finance, that on efficiency grounds each generation ought to
bear an arbitrarily small share in the outcome of any lottery.3 This argument is formalized
in section 1.
One problem with this argument is that the process by which random outcomes are
shared with future generations is by adding to the capital stock when the outcome is
favorable and consuming part of the capital stock when the outcome is unfavorable. Yet
accounting explicitly for the economic effects of changing the capital stock makes the
problem much more complicated. These and other complications are explored in section
2.
In these first two sections, we assume that the government does have the power to
precommit future generations, and develop a normative model of government behavior.
However, the government may not plausibly be able to precommit later generations, re-
gardless of the cx post outcomes. While the risk-sharing policy raises the expected utility
of future generations, based on the information available at the time of enactment, future
generations at birth may well find themselves worse off due to the risk-sharing policy, given
the observed outcomes on all past lotteries. In section 3, we develop two different posi-
tive models of government behavior to explore when a given risk-sharing scheme, present
This intuition has been stated previously in Stiglitzl983ab] and Gordon[1985].
2initially, would end up being repealed at a later date when some futuregeneration, seeing
past outcomes, finds the implications of the policy unfavorable for them.
Throughout the above sections, we ignore the possibility that the familycan engage
in similar risk-sharing schemes between differentgenerations, eliminating the need for
government intervention. In fact, one might reinterpret our results as describingoptimal
family behavior rather than optimal government behavior. In section4, we explore briefly
in what ways risk-sharing through the family would face differentproblems than risk-
sharing through the government.
1. Risk Sharing Between Generations: Base Case
We begin by exploring risk sharing in avery simple two period overlapping generations
model. For simplicity, we assume there is no population growth andno technological
change. Generations are therefore identical except for the period in whichthey are born.
The generation born in period t, and its earnings, are denotedthrough use of a subscript
t.
Members of each generation are assumed to work Only while theyare young and to
consume only while they are old. We assume they work a fixed amount whileyoung,
earning a nonstochastic wage w. They save this labor income and earn a stochasticreturn,
et, on it of mean zero, and variance .s, allowing them to consume w + e when theyare
old.4 Their utility depends solely on theirconsumption, which is stochastic. We assume,
for simplicity, that their ex ante utility can be expressedas a function of their expected
income and the variance of this income, and denote their utilityby U(w) —V(.s).5
The outcome of the stochastic event is revealed "betweenperiods," so after the previ-
ous generation has died but before the next generation is born. 'For simplicity,we assume
that each stochastic event is identically distributed and independent of allothers. Because
there are never two generations alive both before and aftera stochastic event, there is no
possibility of sharing risk between generations through the market. Weassume, though,
that risk is efficiently shared among members of each generation. Each individualtherefore
has expected utility of U(w) —V(s).When it adds clarity, we include a subscript on the
utility function indicating the generation number.
Since two generations are always alive simultaneously, however, thegovernment can
transfer income from one to the other, based on the outcome ofpast events, and raise the
expected utility of every generation, expected as of the date of enactment of theprogram.
For example, if the government transfers et_i/2 from the old to theyoung in each period
t, then the young in period t receive net income of w + e_i/2. This income issaved,
providing w + e_1/2 + e the next period.6 Part of this is paid as a transfer to the next
This stochastic return represents the return on "the market". Weassume that all
idiosyncratic risks affecting subsets of the population have been diversifiedaway. 'Mostof our results generalize easily to an expected utility model, thoughexposition
is simpler in a mean-variance setting.
6 Weassume that the same random income e is received independently of how much
3generation, however, leaving w + (e2_1 + et)/2 for consumption. Expected utility of all but
the initial generation t would therefore be U(w) —V(var((et_.i+ et)/2)) =U(w)
—V(.s/2).
Each lottery is shared between two generations, allowing a pooling of risks and an increase
in expected utility. The first generation does yet better since it shares in only one lottery.
Its expected utility equals U(w) —V(var(ei/2))=U(w)
—V(s/4).
This tax-transfer scheme can easily be redesigned so as to share each .lottery between
ri generations. For example, the transfer from old to young in period t can be specified
to be jT' If this policy has been in effect for at least n —1generations, the
utility of generation t, expected as of the date of enactment of the policy, can be expressed
n—i as U(w) —V(var(>2oe_/n)) =U(w)
—V(s/n).Again the first ii —1generations
would fare yet better. As risk is shared among more generations —asn becomes larger
—expectedutility of each generation increases as well. In fact, as n increases without
bound, each generation's utility converges to U(tu)andthe costs of bearing the collective
risks drop to zero.
In this argument, we described the government policy as a tax-transfer scheme. It
could equivalently have been described as a particular stochastic government debt policy.
if each lottery is to be shared equally between n generations then the government upon
seeing the outcome Ct can retire [(n —1)/n.Jetdollars of debt, funded by a tax on the old
(those who received Ct), then reissue Ct/n. dollars of debt during each of the following n—i
periods, paying the proceeds of each debt issue to the old in that period. This policy
results in the same redistribution of risk as the tax-transfer scheme described above.
Obviously, the above model is highly simplified. However, the conclusions are robust
to many types of generalizations. The basic intuition being modelled is that each lottery
ought to be shared relatively equally among all current and future individuals, and there are
many future individuals relative to the current number of individuals. What is social risk at
any one date is idiosyncratic risk when pooled with the independent lotteries of many later
generations. Thus almost all risk should be passed forward to future generations. This
conclusion remains even if we introduce an autocorrelation structure to the error terms,
as long as no shock leaves permanent after effects. Similarly, we can allow individuals to
consume throughout their life, have lotteries which occur at any point during their life,
and have any type of risk-averse utility function, and still argue that idiosyncratic risks
ought to be pooled. Allowing for income growth or population growth would only increase
the incentive to share risk with the future.
2. Risk Sharing Between Generations: Complicating Factors
However, some of the simplifying assumptions in the above argument are critical. The
mechanism by which random fluctuations in income are transmitted to later generations is
through random fluctuations in the capital stock. In the above argument, these fluctuations
in the capital stock had no effect on wage rates or interest rates, and we did not impose
a nonnegativity constraint on the capital stock. Taking account of these complications
results in a substantial quantitative change in the conclusions of the argument.
is saved from the previous period.
4One general way to respecify the problem, taking account of these complications would
be as follow. Given the capital stock, k, saved by the older generation, and given the labor
supply, h, of the younger generation, output equals f(k, h)z, where z is a random variable
with mean one and some variance s, and where f(.,.) satisfies the standard characteristics
of a production function. In order to insure that the desired capital stock remains positive,
we could assume that the production function satisfies the Inada conditions with respect
to k, given h. Available resources for consumption and savings then equal 'output plus the
remaining capital stock k. Tax or debt policy could be used as before to vary the capital
stock stochastically to reallocate risk between generations.
This problem is related to those explored in the optimal stochastic growth literature
by, for example, Merton[1975] and Brock-Mirman{1972]. Unfortunately, we have not been
able to conclude anything of interest about an optimal stochastic tax policy in this general
a setting. While the lack of an intergenerational risk-sharing market implies the possibility
of Pareto improving trades accomplished through government intervention, little morecan
be said in general. Even the desired direction of transfer of risk is not obvious, for in the
above formulation the wage rate and the return to capital willvary proportionately. The
market therefore divides the lottery proportionately between the initial two generations.
Since the second generation now saves a stochastic amount depending on this initial lottery,
the wage rate of the next generation also depends on the outcome of this first lottery, and
so on. There is nothing in the specification to indicate how this arbitrary division of risk
between different generations differs from an efficient division. -
Inthis section, we will try to shed some light on the factors affecting the nature of
the optimal risk sharing policy by introducing one type of complication at a time and
describing its implications for the optimal policy. In doing so, we make two simplifying
assumptions about government policy. First, we assume that if .the government is sharing
each lottery between n generations, then it can choose any proportional amounta1 of the
initial lottery to allocate to the generation born i periods later, subject to the constraint
that =1.For simplicity, the sharing rule is not allowed to vary over time, as a
fUnction of the state of the economy, or as a function of the outcome of the lottery.
The second simplifying assumption we make is that the objective of the government
is to maximize the expected utility of the steady-state generations, expected as of the
date when the policy is enacted. By steady-state generations we mean those generations
who share in n —1past lotteries in addition to keeping some share of their own lottery.
In contrast, the first n —1generations alive after the policy is enacted fare better than
these steady-state generations since they keep the same fraction of their own lottery, but
do not have to participate in as many past lotteries. Therefore, if a policy raises steady-
state expected utility, it will raise the expected utility of earlier generations as well, and
therefore be a Pareto improvement.
We realize that the definition of Pareto improvement in the context of differential in-
formation is somewhat controversial. We have adopted the view that a Pareto improvement
means that each generation is expected to be better off given the information available at
the time of enactment of the policy. An alternative definition of Pareto improvement, ex-
5amined in Peled[19821, requires that each generation have higher expected utility at birth,
conditional on the information available at that time. In the context of intergenerational
redistribution, this would require that each generation have higher expected utility given
the payments it owes to the previous generation. Peled shows that, under his definition,
a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient, and thus no government intervention is war-
ranted. When we claim a Pareto improvement, we mean by this that each generation gains
by the policy change in the eyes of the decision-maker, evaluated using 'the information
available at the time the policy is enacted.
Using the model of the economy of section 1 and the policy described there, a steady-
state generation, born in period t, would end up with consumption equal to w+' .aet_
and expected utility of U(w) —V(sa). The policy which maximizes steady state utility
is simply a =1/nfor all i. Therefore the optimal policy, given the above assumptions
is precisely the equal sharing policy examined previously in section 1. In the following
sections, we will examine how this optimal policy changes as we change assumptions.
2.1 Positive Real RettLrn to Savings
To begin with, we assume that income from capital equals rk± + et, where r is greater
than zero and nonstochastic, rather than simply ct.7Ifgeneration t is still allotted the
share a, of the lottery which occurred i periods earlier, then its consumption in the second
period would be w + aej_(1 + r), yielding expected utility of
U(w) -V[a(1 + r)2isj. (1)
Maximizing steady state utility with respect to the a, subject to the constraint that
a =1,we find at the optimum that
(1 + r)2 aj= (2) T01(i + r)2
and utility equals U(w)_V(s/(j(1+r)_2i)). As before, utility increases as n increases,
and in the limit utility converges to U(w) —V(.s(r2 +2r)/(1 + r)2), while a converges to
(r2+2r)/(1+r)2(1+i). Unlike in the base case, each generation still bears some risk and, in
particular, passes forward to later generations only a fraction 1/(1 + r)2 of its own lottery.
In the original model, when part of the outcome of a particular lottery was trans-
ferred to the next generation, the consumption of that generation changed by exactly the
amount transferred. Now, however, when a lottery is passed to the next generation, its
consumption changes by (1 + r) times the outcome of the lottery. Therefore, the variance
of its consumption increases by (1+r)2 times the variance of the outcome of the lottery. In
the process of transferring risk to the next generation, it grows in size due to the earnings
on the random addition to the capital stock. This change in the terms of trade between
generations makes it more expensive to pass risk forward to later generations, and as a
result less risk-sharing ought to occur.
If we introduced population growth simultaneously, then r would simply be reinter-
preted to equal the excess of the interest rate over the population growth rate.
62.2 Compounding of lotteries
For simplicity of notation, let us assume again that r =0,but now assume that the
stochastic shock to income is proportional to the capital stock, so that the income tocapital
equals ek rather than simply t•Whensome share of the outcome of a lottery is passed
forward to later generations, it earns a stochastic rate of return, so lotteriescompound.
If each individual is still allotted the share a1 of the lottery occurring iperiods earlier,
then due to compounding of lotteries, the extra risk it would bearas a result of this lottery
would be as(1 + s)'. Steady state utility becomes U(w) —V(s a(1+ s)). This
expression is very close to that appearing in equation (1), and we can conclude directly
that the optimal values of the a1 are
a =(1+s)/((i + s)), (3)
and in the limit, as n increases, a1 =&/(l±3)1+i. Whenrisk is passed to a. later generation,
it grows in variability due to the random return it earns each period. Asa result, it is
more "expensive" than in our base case to pass risk on to later generations, and less ought
to be done.
2.5 Diminishing returnstosavings
When the policy proposed in section 1 is used to share riskamong n generations, the
capital stock saved by a steady state generation would equal w + '((n —j)/n)e_.
There is nothing in the model which assures that this capital stock is positive.Moreover,
as n gets larger, the stochastic process for the capital stock follows close to a random walk
from one generation to the next, and a random walk has probabilityone of hitting any
boundary (e.g., a requirement that the capital stock be nonnegative) in finite time. Our
model t'refore does not guarantee that net assets remain positive.
This is not such a problem with the model if the economy isopen, and if the govern-
ment can borrow from foreigners at an exogenous interest rate. The domestic capital stock
can be large and positive even when the net asset position of individuals in the country is
negative since foreigners can own large amounts of both corporate and government bonds.
Even the world's capital stock is finite, however, so the logical constraint that thecapital
stock be nonnegative will eventually be violated even in anopen economy.
One way to proceed is to impose a constraint that net assets must always bepositive,
and recalculate the optimal policy.8 Introducing these constraints should lower theoptimal
degree of risk-sharing with the future, and also provide an added incentive to buildup the
capital stock.
8Sucha model would be related to models of optimal savings as in Foley-Hellwig[1975J,
models of optimal commodity stockpiles, and also models of lifetime consumption and
portfolio rules under uncertainty, as in Merton[1971].
7The prime farce keeping the capital stock positive, however, is presumably the large
marginal product of capital when the capital stock is small. Assume, for example, that
the income earned by capital equals f(kt) + ej, where f(.) satisfies the Inada conditions.
To avoid the complications added by a nonzero interest rate, assume that 1(w) =0.
In this setting, it is easy to show that some risk-sharing remains worthwhile. Consider,
for example, a two generation tax-transfer scheme. Given the transfer policy, the utility
of a generation in steady-state can be expressed as
U[w + Ef(w + act_i)] —V[(1
—a)2s+ a2s + var(f(w + act_i)) + Eaet_if (w + act_i)].
The first derivative of utility with respect to a equals
äEf ôvar(f) 2 ____ — V'[
äa
—2(1
—2a)s+ Eet_if + aEe_ 1f']. (4)
Evaluated at a =U,this derivative simplifies to 2.sV', which is clearly positive. Therefore,
some policy intervention raises steady-state utility.
The first-derivative described in equation (4) contains a number of extra terms which
do not appear in the earlier models. The first term measures the drop in expected capital
income when more risk is shared. Since the production function is concave, adding random
fluctuations to the capital stock causes expected capital income to fall. In addition, the
variance of consumption should increase faster than it did in the original model as risk-
sharing increases. First, income from capital should become more variable as the capital
stock becomes more variableY The last two terms capture the increase in risk due to
the positive correlation between income from capital and the size of the capital stock.
Together, these four extra terms all reduce the gain from bcreasing a at every point, and
imply that the optimal value of a is smaller here than in the original model.
2..4 Moral hazard effects of a tax-transfer scheme
In the original model, the tax-transfer scheme created no excess burden —individuals
had an exogenous labor supply, saved everything from the first period, and consumed
everything during the second period, regardless of the policy. In this section, we explore
the possible moral hazard problems created by taxing random income.
What moral hazard problems are created depends on the specific form of taxation.
Tax payments by any individual could be specified to be independent of that individual's
actions, depending only on the outcome of the "market" as a whole. In this case, each
individual's incentives are left unchanged by the transfer payment, even though risk is
being shared with later generations. Of course, if individuals are heterogeneous, such a
policy may not be desirable on distributional grounds.
If each individual is taxed based on his ownership share in the market lottery, then
in general the tax does create a distortion cost, and these costs must be traded off with
This is unambiguously true when a is small.
8the efficiency gain from spreading risks across generations. For example,assume that
each individual can invest in either of two assets, one riskiess and the otherrisky. His
income from savings will equal i(w —k)+ (r + c)k, where Waishis first-period income
after including transfers, i is the riskiess rate of return, k is the amount invested in the
risky asset, r is the expected return on this asset, and e is the random component of the
return. To maintain consistency with our original model, we simplify by setting i =0.
The government taxes each individual an amount equal to a(r+e — for some tax
parameters a and fi,andtransfers the proceeds in a lump-sum fashion to members of the
next generation.
This tax scheme reduces to the two generation risk-sharing scheme describedoriginally if =rand a =.5.Given these parameters, we show that investors will not take account of
the risk-bearing costs of that share of the risk going to the next generation when they make
their investment decisions, resulting in overinvestment in the risky activity. Asa result
of this moral hazard cost, the optimal degree of risk-sharing would be smaller.However,
the size of the moral hazard cost depends critically on the size of L3. Inparticular, if the
transfer to the next generation has an expected value just large enough tocompensate
them for bearing the extra risk, then we show that investment decisionsare not distorted
and the optimal degree of risk-sharing remains unchanged
Under the above tax-transfer scheme, consumption of a generation in steady-state'°
would equal (w + a(r + e1 — — k)+ (1 + r + e)k —a(re —/3)k,where e and
k_1 refer to variables describing the previous generation. Expected utility, expectedas of
the date the policy is enacted, therefore equals
U[w + a(r —,8)Eki+ (r(1 —a) +a/3)Ek] —V[a2sEk2 + (1 —a)2sEk2}. (5)
Differentiating steady-state utility with respect to a, setting the derivative tozero, and
performing some simple manipulations yields
2asE1V' =2(1 —a)sEk2V'+ (r —j3)(Ek1





Since the individuals in this generation choose k optimally, the third term on the right-
hand side of equation (6) must equal zero. Also, at the date the policy isenacted, the
expected steady-state capital stock is constant, so Ek1 =Ek,implying that the second
term on the right-hand side of the equation also equals zero. It therefore follows that the
optimal a,denotedby a*, must satisfy
* ii —1 * —1 1 a = .5+AU r —,8)E
—AV2sa Ek1 , aa ôa
When behavior changes in response to the tax, k will evolve over time after the tax-
transfer scheme is enacted. In steady-state, as now defined, the probability distribution of
k remains constant.
9where A =cz*/(4sV1Ek2)
If /3= r, aswas implicitly assumed in the original model, then the second term in
equation (7) equals zero. In addition, since the government now absorbs a fraction of the
random component of the return on the risky activity without changing the mean return,
it is easy to show that (ak1/aa)> 0.Each generation chooses to undertake too much of
the risky activity, since it ignores the risk-bearing costs imposed on the next generation,
and we see from equation (7) that the optimal value of a is now smaller than .5.
This moral hazard cost disappears, however, if the last two terms in equation (7)
sum to zero, which occurs if any extra risk transferred to the next generation is offset
by a suitable risk premium. For example, if /30, we find comparing the thiid and
fourth terms on the right-hand side of equation (6) that if a =.5,then the fourth term
must equal zero as well. If the fourth term equals zero then equation (7) implies that the
optimal a does in fact equal .5. With /3 =0and a.5, each generation is in effect a fifty
percent partner in the risky investment undertaken by the previous generation. Given the
symmetric positions of the two generations, when one generation is indifferent to further
investment, so is the other. Investment decisions are no longer distorted, and there are no
moral hazard costs generated by the tax-transfer scheme.
In general, eliminating any distortion in the risk-sharing scheme requires that future
generations be just indifferent to the change in transfers that results when an investor
considers changing his investment in a risky activity. Except in this situation, moral hazard
problems do complicate the design of a tax-transfer scheme.11 Moral hazard problems do
not necessarily lower the amount of risk shared with the future, however. For example, if
/3wereless than zero, then it is straight-forward to show that the optimal a* is greater
than .5.
3.TimeConsistency of the Policy
In analyzing the government policy so far, we have assumed that what is optimal ex
ante will in fact be done ex post. However, at each future date, both generations know
the outcome of past lotteries. Even if each generation gains ex ante under the risk-sharing
policy, a generation may well find, after seeing the outcome of past lotteries, that it loses
from the policy and would wish to repeal the program. Whether we would expect it
to succeed in repealing the policy, however, depends on our model of political decision-
making. In this section, we examine the political stability of a risk-sharing scheme in two
alternative models of political decision-making.
In both models, we impose two restrictive assumptions. First, we assume that voters
can repeal an existing risk-sharing policy, but cannot otherwise change its design. Without
this assumption, each generation would try to obtain nonstochastic transfers at the expense
of other generations. In addition, we assume that if the risk-sharing policy is repealed
in a particular period, then it cannot be reenacted in the next period. Otherwise, each
If the amount transferred to an individual depends on his behavior, then further moral
hazard complications arise.
10policy they would follow. In general, however, the family would face a number of difficulties
not faced by the government.
If parents do expect to be able to share their lotteries with future generations within
their family, then they would wish to maintain close to their normal consumption level
even during a very unfavorable event, e.g., a depression. However, they may not at that
point have the financial assets to fund this consumption level. Under the government risk-
sharing policy, the government would issue debt and use it to finance transfer payments.
Under the analagous family policy, the parents would try to borrow funds to finance their
consumption. However, they would lack collateral for the loan, and could not legally
commit their children to pay it back. In contrast, the government would not need explicit
collateral and can legally bind future generations whenever it issues debt.
As we saw in the previous section, a political coalition might well develop under certain
circumstances to repeal a government risk-sharing policy. Within a family risk-sharing
policy, each generation would face similar incentives to "repeal" the policy. However,
within the family, the paying generation could repeal the policy on its own regardless of
the preferences of the receiving generation. Repealing a family risk-sharing policy is much
easier than repealing a government policy.
When would a generation within the family wish to "repeal" the risk-sharing policy?
When considering the preferences of a generation under a government risk-sharing policy,
we assumed that there was a clear link between its willingness to participate in the policy
when it is young and its likelihood of participating in the policy when it is old. In particular,
we assumed that if the policy were repealed now, it would not exist during the next period.
Within the family, however, there is no contractual link between transfers now and transfers
next period. Children may well hope that their children will help them out, independently
of whether they help their parents out. Without this link between transfers now and
transfers next period, every generation would face an incentive torenege. Altruism may
overcome this, but without sufficient altruism the family risk-sharing policy is likely to
break dc. n.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have argued that in designing government debt and tax-transfer
policies, it is important to consider their implications for the allocation of risk between
generations. There is no reason to presume that the market or the family can allocate
risk efficiently to future generations, implying that stochastic government policies have the
potential to create first-order welfare improvements. The model provides a non-Keynsian
justification for debt-finance of wars and recessions, as well as an added rationale for Social
Security type tax-transfer schemes which aid unlucky generations, e.g., the Depression
generation, at the expense of luckier generations.
It is premature, though, at this point to draw any conclusions concerning the degree to
which government debt or tax-transfer policy ought to be modified in light of risk-sharing
considerations. Given the theoretical difficulties of characterizing the optimal policy in
more general settings, the answer to this question must await more detailed theoretical
13work as well as results from computer simulations.
14generation would try to avoid sharing in past lotteries, yet attempt toget future generations
to share in its own lottery. This restriction seems plausiblegiven the stability of existing
government policies.
In our first model of political decision-making, weassume that the younger generation
is slightly more numerous and that the medianvoter, who would be young, controls the
government.12 Assume in addition that each generation's lottery isbounded below by
—b, and that the proposed policy involves a transfer from children toparents which is a
strictly decreasing function of the outcome of each of the previous n —1lotteries. Assume
as well that the policy involves a net payment from children to parents when theworst
outcome occurs during each of the previous n —1lotteries. But if all these worst outcomes
do occur, the children will surely vote for repeal. They must make themaximum possible
payment to their parents for certain, and they can receive back the same amount from their
own children only if they also suffer the worst outcome on their lottery. Withany other
outcome of their own lottery, they lose on net from the policy. Assume thenthat there
is some maximum payment that children would willingly maketo their parents without
voting for repeal. But if children are asked to make this payment, by thesame argument
they will refuse. At best, they can just recoup their losses from theirown children, and
most of the time they lose on net. Therefore children wouldrepeal the policy whenever
they are asked to make a payment to their parents, and wouldeven repeal it when the
transfer their parents make to them is sufficiently small.'3
Once the policy has been repealed, however, the nextgeneration would have no interest
in restarting the policy, since regardless of itsown luck, its children would never pay them
anything, whereas the policy would still involve its payingmoney to the next generation
under some outcomes. They would be better off withno policy in effect. Therefore, even
if the policy were in effect initially, once childrenare asked to make a payment to their
parents, the policy would be repealed and never reestablished.
One obvious mechanism to handle this likelihood ofrepeal is to require a sufficiently
large pli.•ality for repeal. Another would be to build into the policya large enough penalty
on any generation that chooses to repeal to eliminateany incentive to do so. This penalty
could involve either a tax, the proceeds from which could be usedto retire government
debt, or merely the administrative and social disruption that wouldensue if the government
were to default on its legal obligations (as would happen if past transferswere funded
by government debt rather than by a tax-transfer scheme, suchas Social Security). To
guarantee that repeal would never occur, however, this penalty must be largeenough so
that even if the worst outcome has occurred during theprevious ii— 1 generations the next
12 Population growth affects theoptimal policy in a continuous fashion, but affects the
median voter discontinuously. We ignore the effects of slightpopulation growth on the
optimal policy. ' Thisargument breaks down if population growth is important, for then muchmore
is received from the next generation than is paid to theprevious generation. But with
population growth and a zero interest rate, the economy is beyond the golden ruleimplying
various possible ways to increase everyone's utility.
11generation would rather follow through on the policy, receiving in partial compensation
the right to share its own lottery with future generations, rather than face the penalty.
One unattractive feature of the median voter model is that it implies that the Social
Security program should have no chance of survival politically, since it always requires
that children pay parents. Yet historically Social Security has been a remarkably stable
program. As one simple alternative to the median voter model of political decision-making,
let us assume that a policy would be repealed whenever those in favor of repeal are willing
to pay more towards this effort than those against repeal are willing to pay to avoid it.14
The government, for example, could be presumed to support that policy receiving the most
support from lobbiests. Given this model of government decision-making, the analysis of
when repeal occurs is very simple. At any date, the optimal risk-sharing policy involves
a nonstochastic transfer between old and young plus a promise of a stochastic transfer
to the current young during the next period. Ignoring the next period's transfer, both
generations have exactly the same income at stake, and their political influences would
exactly counterbalance by assumption. If the presence of the stochastic transfer during
the next period raises the expected utility of the current young, conditional on knowledge
of the outcome of past lotteries, then they would be more in favor of maintaining the
policy, or at least less inclined to oppose it. Since preferences were otherwise exactly
counterbalanced, we conclude that the policy will remain in force whenever the young gain
by the presence of the stochastic transfer during the next period.
When do the young gain from the next period's transfer? They certainly gain if the
policy always involves a (stochastic) payment from young to old, as under Social Security.
If the policy were always to require payments from parents to children, then it would
certainly be repealed. In general repeal would occur whenever, given knowledge of the
outcome of past lotteries, the expected payment from parents to children during the next
period is large enough to offset any gain from sharing risk with future generations. Thus,
in sharp contrast to the results of the previous model, we now find that a tax-transfer
program like Social Security has a most stable design, and according to our model would
ne'.er be repealed.
Under this model, if a risk-sharing policy does not yet exist, any generation would
be very much in favor of enacting it, since the first generation receives a transfer from its
children while making none to its parents. Why should we expect the political process to
enact a risk-sharing program, however, rather than simply to transfer wealth from future
to present generations? We have not attempted to address this more basic question.
4. The Family as an Alternative Risk-Sharing Institution
Why cannot the family provide the same type of risk sharing between generations of
the family that the above government policies would provide? If parents are altruistic and
would always wish to leave a positive bequest, regardless of events, then they could easily
provide the same risk-sharing. The above analysis in effect characterizes the risk-sharing
14 See Wellisz and Wilson[19841 for an extended application of this model.
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